CERCLA cases often include
mediations, either court-sponsored or party-initiated, as a mechanism to
achieve allocation of liability for the costs of environmental cleanup at the
subject Superfund site. Because these
cases often include many potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) numbering in
the scores or hundreds or more, the mediation process can be complex, lengthy
and expensive. Careful attention to the
structure and sequence of the mediation process components is critical for
achievement of a timely, successful, and cost-effective mediation outcome.
The impetus driving the timing
of the mediation is often a critical determinant of what can be accomplished in
a many-party CERCLA mediation.
Typically, the driving event is either an impending negotiation with EPA
or the state environmental agency over performance of a response action at the
site or a court deadline such as a pending trial date. The particular deadline is likely to
determine the extent to which a cash-out settlement, a pay-as-you-go settlement,
or an interim allocation is to be available as a mediation outcome. These deadlines are, of course, subject to
varying degrees of strictness. However,
as with most other mediations, the ability to successfully conclude many-party
CERCLA mediations depends heavily upon the notion that opportunities to achieve
favorable outcomes will expire with the mediation deadline.
The presence or absence of prior
motions practice on liability-related issues is typically an important factor
in these mediations. The mediating
parties benefiting from earlier court decisions press the “law of the case”
argument in their party-specific mediations.
Of course, the mediating parties disadvantaged by prior decisions
distinguish their facts from the prior decisions and assert their likelihood of
achieving a more favorable decision when their motions are decided. These issues, either addressed or unaddressed
in prior motions practice, provide a large portion of the subject matter of
individual party mediations in the overall mediation process.
In cases involving mediations
between PRP Settling Party Participating Groups (“PRP Group”) and
not-yet-settled PRPs, the forcing mechanism may be a “most-favored nation”
provision that promises that no subsequent settling parties will receive more
favorable settlement terms than those achieved by parties settling during the
mediation. In practice, these provisions
can be a two-edged sword, because members of the PRP Group may have received
such provisions when they settled before the mediation. This can have the effect of drastically
limiting the ability of the PRP Group to compromise on issues that it has
previously addressed in settlements with its members.
As a result, the not-yet-settled
PRPs often experience considerable frustration in attempting to reach
compromises on these “previously settled” issues that differ from the
resolution reached in the intra-PRP Group negotiations. For example, a not-yet-settled PRP may
experience fierce resistance from the PRP Group in seeking differing terms of
the allocation between classes of PRPs such as waste generators and
transporters. The PRP Group would be
reluctant to re-negotiate those terms internally (to match the terms sought by
the mediating party) among its members who had previously come to resolution on
them and had incorporated the result into the existing most-favored-nation
provisions applicable to Group members. The
mediator must insist in such negotiations that the PRP Group is transparent
about the terms of its most-favored-nation provisions in order to provide the
mediating parties with a clear assessment of the difficulties in addressing
these terms.
The sequence of mediation
activities is also a critical determinant of success and efficiency in
many-party CERCLA mediations. Most
CERCLA mediations include PRPs from several or all of the CERCLA classes of
PRPs – owners, operators, generators and transporters. In order to achieve an overall resolution in
which each party knows its specific share, either in absolute or relative
terms, of the overall allocation, it is necessary for each class of PRPs to
receive a collective allocation for that class and it is necessary for each
class of PRPs to be able to negotiate its relative share with the other classes
of PRPs.
Accomplishing PRP class
allocations is likely to require the mediator to conduct subordinate mediations
to establish the class allocation of the respective PRP classes to determine
the remaining shares to be allocated among the other PRP classes. Of particular note, the owner and operator
shares are essential and often quite controversial. There is commonly considerable antipathy
between the other PRP classes and the owners and operators, due to disaffection
with owners’ and operators’ management of wastes at the facility. This disaffection may require a comprehensive
airing of the facility operations in the context of the mediation to establish
a basis for agreement on the owner-operator shares. This, in turn, may depend upon prior
discovery and disclosure of information about facility operations. Similarly, negotiations between the generator
and transporter classes on issues such as which party selected the disposal
site may require prior discovery and disclosure about transactional
details. Again, the mediator must
endeavor to assure transparency of available information to facilitate these
inter-class mediations. It is also
necessary for the mediator to develop a critical path of issue resolution to
determine the most efficient sequence for the subordinate mediations. This can be a tricky determination given that
negotiating leverage may accrue to PRP classes whose issues are resolved early
in the process.
Finally, the cost-effectiveness,
and apparent cost-effectiveness, of the mediation process is heavily
influenced by the sequence of subordinate mediations. As in most mediations, each party desires to
have the opportunity to fully air its case and its issues directly with the
mediator. In many-party CERCLA
mediations absent subordinate mediations addressing issues common to PRP
classes, these individual mediations could become very repetitive and parties
with later mediation sessions could conclude that their issues were not subject
to full airing if they had been resolved in prior party-specific
mediations. In particular,
later-mediating parties whose time with the mediator is limited due to prior resolution
of their respective issues may feel cheated of their opportunity to mediate and
may feel that they did not get their moneys’ worth from the mediation. It is important for the mediator to
communicate the results and the contents of prior subordinate mediations to all
of the parties so that they can be confident that their individual issues were
fully represented and heard in the prior mediations. Mediating parties in individual mediations
can thereby be aware of the considerable resources already expended on resolution
of their specific issues.
Preti Flaherty attorneys E. Michael Thomas and Jeff Talbert contributed to this article.